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"Stopgap measures taken in an atmosphere of crisis-management Lr1 J.. :.. 
are no longer adequate given the changed nature of todaY'sOArmed .~y 
Forces, the uncertainty of current international relations, and I~, 
the mood of the Congress. To delay further the modernization 
of the basic structure of defense officer personnel policies 
means only that the Department of Defense and the military 
departments will continue to improvise on the patchwork quilt." 
EDITORS COMMENT: In our feature article for this week the author, Major James K. Evetts, 
Jr., USA, charges that officers are managed in "patchwork quilt" manner which is inadequate 
for successful management of today's armed forces, even if they were ever adequate in the 
past. Major Evetts is a graduate of Duke University and the Air Command and Staff College. 
His articles gives an overview of legislation now in effect concerning officer personnel 
laws and policies and some recommendations to change them. It appears in the September-
October 1974 issue of the Air University Review. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: MANAGING THE BOSSES: ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEM 
"Appropriate phrases to describe the continuing calls for modernization of the basic 
structure of defense personnel policies are 'increasingly frequent' and 'ever more stringent.' 
Continued reliance on policies prescribed by laws adopted for the military of another era 
is perceived variously by critics as anachronistic, wasteful, unjust, cumbersome, detrimental 
to a volunteer force, conspiratorial, or some combination of all these pejoratives. 
Ironically, some of the most vocifeous critics may be surprised to discover that the 
Department of Defense views the situation in much the same way. Faced with large scale 
decreases in force levels and particularly serious fluctuations in the population of 
commissioned officers, personnel managers at the Department of Defense are perhaps more 
acutely aware of the problems relating to current personnel policies than some of their 
Congressional critics. 
It is, of course, the Constitutional responsibility of the Congress to provide the 
armed forces such flexible and efficient management tools as are required to administer 
appointments, promotions, separations, and r~ents of all members of the armed services. 
~ However, since World War II the manner in which Congress has discharged its responsibility 
and the way in which teh services have interpreted and applied the laws have led to a 
veritable patchwork quilt of personnel legislation and policy, particularly in areas 
relating to the administration of officers. 
It is the patchwork quilt of defense officer personnel pOlicies that this article 
addresses in three steps. First, it will described some current defense officer personnel 
laws and policies with a view toward evaluating their usefulness in today's armed forces. 
Next, the proposals made by the Department of Defense to render the policies uniformly 
understandable to its members and to the Congress will be examined. Finally, observations 
will be offered on a few of the facets of the proposals that may influence the probability 
of their eventual adoption. It is hoped that, armed with the information presented, the 
reader will be better able to judge for himself whether this portion of the proposed 
Defense Officer Personnel Management Systems (DOPMS), which was submitted to Congress in 
January 1974, promises a bright new era of administration for commissioned officers or an 
attempt to gain too much at once. 
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It might appear reasonable to assume that creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 
would have made standard such matters of fundamental importance as the promotion of officers 
of the three military departments. Yet, for reasons valid at the time of their adoption, 
the managerial needs of the three services dictated over several years different systems for 
selection for temporary and permanent promotion. 
For example, permanent promotions-those that govern an officer's tenure-were prescribed 
by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Temporary promotions-those that allow an officer to 
assume higher rank, receive increased pay and allowances, and fill positions of greater 
responsibility-were and are made within restrictions specified by the Officer Grade Limit-
ation Act of 1954. Not surprisingly, legislation enacted at different times, to provide 
for particular situations here or perculiar occurrences there, spawned varying policies on 
promotion. In the Army and Air Force the two legislative acts were interpreted as requiring 
that an officer be selected by separate promotion boards on separate occasions for advance-
ment to the same visible rank-once for temporary or insignia-change promotion and a second 
time for permanent (regular) promotion relating to tenure. Conversely, law and policy as ~ 
they pertain to the advancement of officers of the Navy and Marine Corps provide for but 
a single selection for promotion to both temporary and permanent grade as vacancies occur 
within respective statutory limitations. Thus grade, pay, and tenure of these officers are 
governed by single selections for promotion throughout their careers. 
Another patch in the quilt relates to the differences in retirement and separation 
criteria as they are prescribed by Congressional direction. Mandatory separation or 
retirement of regular officers after certain lengths of commissioned service is required 
by law. Even so, depending upon the rank attained, statutory tenure differs among the 
services. To illustrate the point, the cases of two officers can be hypothesized. A Navy 
officer whose permanent rank is that of commander has failed on two successive occasions to 
be selected by promotion boards for advancement to regular Navy captain. An Army lieutenant 
colonel has likewise failed of selection on two successive occasions for promotion to regular 
colonel. The Navy officer will be involuntarily retired upon completion of 26 years of 
commissioned service, but his colleague in the Army may not be involuntarily retired until 
he has completed 28 years of commissioned service. The apparent inequity might have been 
compounded if the hypothetical incidents had occurred in the early 1960s. At that time 
Congress authorized the Navy officer up to $2000 in extra compensation while his Army 
colleague was not authorized extra separation pay. Whether up to $2000 in extra compensation 
offsets the deficit of two years active duty in the mind of the Navy commander will remain 
unexplored. The point is that if the cited variations in officer personnel administration 
defy the logic of the reader, they may transcend logic to produce displeasure, annoyance, 
suspicion, and confusion for the legislator who attempts to discharge his Constitutional 
responsibility of making "rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces. 
In response to Congressional demand and its own discomfiture with the unwieldy system 
in existence, the Department of Defense formed a study group in 1972, the findings and 
conclusions of which formed the basis for a report to Congress entitled 'Report on Officer 
Grade Limitations.' In the report the Secretary of Defense made proposals that, if enacted 
in legislative form, would significantly modify both the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 
and the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. According to the Secretary, the ends 
sought were those of 
--allowing the services to meet requirements for officers in the various grades at 
ages conducive to effective performance, 
--providing career opportunities that effectively attract and retain the number of high 
caliber officers required, and 
--making consistent among the services the career opportunities afforded. 
These ends, the Secretary stated, would be best served if the Congress were to provide 
flexible and effective management tools to the Department of Defense and to the armed services. 
Specifically, the Secretary of Defense asked that the Congress take action to 
--establish new permanent statutory limitations on the numbers of officers who may 
serve in certain grades, 
--provide common rules for the appointment of regular officers and for the active duty 
service of reserve officers. 
--enact uniform provisions of law for the promotion of officers, eliminating the existing 
system of temporary promotions, and 
--establish universally applicable statutes governing tenure and mandatory separation 
or retirement for reasons other than physical disability. 
If considered superficially, the goals sought appeared little different from the objectives 
of both of the previous officer personnel management acts. However, beneath the surface 
the proposals contained some provisions that, if enacted, would represent major changes in 
current pOlicy and law. 
....... 
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In the first place, the proposals relating to statutory grade limitations would apply 
to all officers between the ranks of first lieutenant (Navy lieutenant, junior grade) and 
colonel (Navy captain). A feature of the proposal relating to grade limitation that bears 
noting is that officers in the ranks mentioned who are recalled to active duty in emergencies 
would be included in computations for specified grades for two years following their recall. 
Provisions for a single standardized promotion system for each service, with promotions 
made on a permanent basis as vacancies occur within the grade limitations discussed previously, 
represent the second major change included in the proposed legislation. The need for Army 
and Air Force officers to undergo two separate selections for promotion to a given rank 
has long been questionable. The temporary promotion system determines the active duty 
rank of the vast majority of officers in those two services, and temporary promotion 
currently precedes permanent promotion by several years. If the proposed plan is enacted 
by Congress, promotion timing and opportunities would be as follows: 
Commissioned Survivors of 
Service in Grade 100 Career 
Years Achieved Officers 
0 Second Lieutenant/ 100 
Ensign 
2 First Lieutenant/ 96 
Lieutenant (j g) 
4 Captain/ 87 
Lieutenant 
10-11 Major/ 65 
Lieutenant Commander 
16-17 Lieutenant Colonel/ 41 
Commander 









The declining number of survivors is attributed to several factors other than voluntary 
resignation. Attrition resulting from death or disability accounts for some of the decline, 
but a greater role in attrition would be played by the forced resignation or retirement of 
those officers who twice failed to be selected for promotion. 
In addition to providing for the involuntary separation or mandatory retirement (if 
eligible) of officers in the grades of captain (Navy lieutenant) or below who twice fail 
of selection for promotion, the proposed statute would authorize the Secretaries of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force to convene boards to weight the desirability of retaining those 
officers in the grades of major (Navy lieutenant commander) and lieutenant colonel (Navy 
commander) who have failed on two successive occasions to be selected for promotion. 
Similarly, continuation boards for officers who have served as colonels or Navy captains 
for at least four years would be convened by the Secretaries, and those not selected for 
continuation on active duty would be involuntarily separated or retired. In both the 
latter cases, a minimum of 70 percent of the officers considered would continue on active 
duty. 
The proposal for altering existing statutory guarantees of tenure appears to be of 
fundamental importance to the accomplishment of the goals of the Defense Department's 
officer personnel management system. A significant item in the Secretary's proposals would 
provide that in each service's corps of officers those with more than eleven year's 
commissioned service would be regulars. Hence if the respective services are to remain 
within prescribed grade ceilings, particularly during periods of rapidly declining officer 
strength, removal or substantial modification of existing guarantees of tenure will be 
imperative. An example of the importance of changing the existing statutory provisions 
\. relating to tenure may be drwan from the current Air Force predicament. 
The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 specified lower ceilings for the numbers of 
lieutenant colonels and colonel in the Air Force than for the Army and Navy. Although ' the 
Congress accepted the stipulation of the younger (in terms of years of active service) 
officer population of the Air Force in 1954, the legislators recognized that, as the Air 
Force officer population 'matured,' the ceilings on lieutenant colonels and colone~s would 
have to be adjusted. Since 1959 the Congress has had to grant the Air Force relief from 
strict adherence to the law no less than six times in order to keep Air Force career 
opportunities comparable to those of the other services. Given the current mood of 
Congress toward wh~t some perceive as 'top-heaviness' in the services and the fact that 
the latest relief granted the Air Force from the ceilings on lieutenant colonels and 
colonels expires on 30 September 1974, the ability to weed out less productive officers in 
these two grades takes on added significance. The repugnant alternatives might be for the 
Air Fo rce to stop promoting entirely or revert to the provisions of the Act of 1954, with 
accompanying severe debilitation of the Air Force to attract and retain high-caliber young 
officers for years to come. 
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Notwithstanding the closely reasoned arguments for new officer grade limitation ceilings, 
the Secretary's proposals regarding tenure have generated a certain amount of controversy 
and criticism. Reasoned criticism centers around the inequities of adopting an 'up or 
out' administrative system whose purpose is perceived as that of sacrificing experience 
and skill for the purpose of allowing promising younger officers to advance in grade. Rising 
costs associated with military retirement programs are seen by other critics as attributable 
to the services' mandating separation or retirement of their members at early ages. The 
argument made by both critical groups is that money, skill, and experience are forfeited 
simply because certain officers reach their limits of potential for advancement in rank. 
One reaction to the legislative proposals cites the provisions for recalling to active duty 
certain involuntarily retired officers as a means of conserving the human resources otherwise 
lost through implementation of the proposals. Recalled on the basis of their individual 
abilities, such officers would serve in an unpromotable status outside the career stream 
of those who compete for continued advancement. It appears that such a procedure would 
have to be employed in numerous cases to offset significantly the human and financial 
problems created by changed tenure and grade limitation laws. Whether the Congress would 
approve of the exercise of such an option on a broad basis appears questionable. 
Legislative proposals related to officer personnel management may generate even greater 
emotional heat and controversy when they are deliberated in conjuction with separate 
proposals for a modernized reitrement act and an act regulating special pay. The Department 
of Defense is hopeful that its proposals will be considered by the second session of the 93d 
Congress so that grade imbalances aggravated by recent force reductions can be corrected, 
but there are several stumbling blocks to be overcome. 
The legislative proposals made by the Department of Defense were predicated on the 
assumption that active duty forces would remain at the authorized strengths projected in the 
Administration's fiscal year 1974 budget. However, in its first session the 93d Congress may 
have signaled that it deman~ even harsher measures to force attrition of officers. If 
similar decreases in service strength are prescribed as the Congress considers the FY 1975 
budget, the Department of Defense may be forced to alter its legislative recommendations to 
provide for some even more drastic menas of coping with overages in officer strength. 
Retirement costs, a subject about which members of Congress are, with increasing frequenc~ 
declaring their astonishment and concern, may emerge as a very significant criterion on which 
the Congress bases its decisions regarding officer strengths. If consciousness of the high 
costs of military 'retirement programs does become predominant, the present legislative 
proposals may be less than warmly received by the Congress simply because the proposed statu~s 
do not promise substantial near-term reductions in the costs of military manpower. 
Historical precedent appears not be on the side of recommendations for fr-reaching reform 
in the administration and management officers in the armed forces. The fate of the all-
ecompassing proposals of the Bolte Program of 1960 may have served as a warning to those 
charged with shepherding the current proposals through Congress. The Bolte Program, formally 
entitled the Department of Defense ad hoc Committee to Study and Revise the Officer Personnel 
Act of 1947,' languished and died largely because it represented such a major departure from 
existing law and policy. 
Although it differed fundamentally from the Bolte Program, submission of the proposed 
Defense Officer Personnel Management System in its entirety to the Congress in early 1974 
elicited a similar legislative response. Three months after the bill was introduced, Senator 
John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, foresaw little chance of the 
measure's receiving prompt Congressional attention. Moreover, the Senator added that he 
had' ... learned enough about it to know that (he did) not think it will be satisfactory to 
the committee.' 
Prospects for adoption of at least parts of the total Defense Department proposal may 
be brightened if two other bills successfully negotiate the Congressional process. The two 
bills, essentially interim measures dealing with tenure for regular colonels, lieutenant 
colonels, and Army captains, were introduced earlier than the bill proposing the Defense 
Officer Personnel Managme at 'System. In certain respects, they offer::· the Congress opportuni-
ties to modify on a narrower basis current law and policy as they pertain to officer personnel 
management. However, their prospects for legislative adoption appear as uncertain as those 
of the broader bill. On a more optimistic note, success in obtaining approval of interim 
measures which complement the entire system could spawn additional piecemeals submission 
of bits and. parts of the whole legislative package. In this way the risks of overwhelming 
the Congress with seemingly massive and intricate recommendations for reform might be lowered, 
and the Department of Defense and the services would gain the management tools they need. 
,-' 
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Whatever strategy the Department of Defense adopts the emphasis will necessarily be 
on time. In an era marked by cyclical expansion and contraction of the armed forces at 
intervals of from ten to fifteen years, to delay further the modernization of the basic 
structure of defense officer personnel policies means only that the Department of Defense 
and the military departments will continue to improvise on the patchwork quilt. Stopgap 
measures taken in an atmosphere of crisis-management are no longer adequate given the 
changed nature of today's armed forces, the uncertainty of current international relations, 
and the mood of the Congress. In the matter of managing the bosses, something must be 
done-and soon." 
